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Abstract: The frame of this chapter is how clinicians and leaders employed in psy-
chiatric departments in hospitals experience and cope with patients who commit 
suicide while undergoing treatment. The major focus is the phenomenon which in 
the Bow-tie model is called “stabilization”. To explore this phenomenon in an empir-
ical analysis, two concepts of samhandling are introduced, these being coordination 
and cooperation. These two concepts are used in an interpretation of what eight 
leaders and clinicians report on how they handle working together after a patient 
during treatment in a psychiatric hospital has unexpectedly committed suicide. 
The findings are that leaders and clinicians have different views on what stabiliza-
tion is. Stabilization to the leaders seems to be something they can handle by using 
mandatory organizational procedures of coordination. To the clinicians (psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists) however, stabilization is less straightforward. Professional 
stabilization is, to them, more important than organizational stabilization, and it 
requires another form of interaction – namely, cooperation. Cooperation is, in its 
simplest and purest form, a symmetrical way of working together, based on equality 
in competence and an unforced relation between the parties. For the purpose of 
professional stabilization, this is the form of interaction preferred by the clinicians. 
However, these findings are tentative and more research is needed to elaborate why 
leaders and clinicians respond as they do after a patient suicide.
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The subject matter of this chapter is how clinicians and leaders employed 
in psychiatric departments in hospitals experience and cope with pati-
ents who commit suicide while undergoing treatment. Thoughts and 
plans of causing one’s own death are not unusual amongst people who 
suffer from mental disorders, but very few of the patients actually carry 
out their plans of suicide. Based on data obtained from interviews with 
a selected group of psychiatrists, psychologists, heads of department 
and sectional leaders, all of whom have experienced the suicide of at 
least one of their patients, we seek answers to the following question: 
After a patient undergoing treatment has committed suicide, how do leaders 
and clinicians at psychiatric departments in hospitals work together? And how 
do they handle the elements of unpredictability in their work?
The analytical aim of this chapter is to explore if, and how, the two 
organizational-theoretical terms, ‘coordination’ and ‘cooperation’ (Axels-
son & Axelsson, 2006) can be used to illuminate differences between 
leaders’ and clinicians’ understanding of an unexpected suicide. From 
the Bow-tie Model (Chapter 1, Torgersen, 2018), our point of departure 
is a phenomenon called ‘stabilization’. ‘Stabilization’ is illustrated in the 
right field of the model and correlates to ‘prevention’ in the left field. 
‘Stabilization’ can occur over a longer or shorter time span. The stabiliza-
tion process starts right after, or in some cases, almost at the same time 
the unexpected incident occurs. The model suggests that ‘loss of control’ 
amongst those who have to cope with the incident, and are affected by it, 
is temporary. 
Cooperation and coordination 
Working together after a patient has committed suicide during treatment 
can be done in multiple ways. Cooperation is, in its purest and simplest 
form, a symmetrical way of working together, based on equality in compe-
tence and an unforced relation between the parties (Axelsson & Axelsson, 
2006). In our context, the concept ‘cooperation’ describes, for example, 
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what the person responsible for the patient’s treatment, e.g. a psychiatrist 
or a psychologist, is seeking if he or she asks an entrusted colleague with 
the same professional background for help to go through the case history 
of a patient who has committed suicide. Cooperation between profes-
sionals usually involves a small number of people. In favorable cases, this 
way of working together can result in the development of new knowledge, 
without the need for a larger organizational apparatus. However, coac-
tion in small professional groups has, as some scholars have observed, a 
‘clan element’ about it (Ouchi, 1980). The ‘clan element’ describes inner 
solidarity between group participants, which tends to develop over time. 
The flip side of the coin of this professional, in-group solidarity, especially 
in critical situations, is that the group is sometimes inclined to reject 
external evaluations. Different variations and degrees of coaction, based 
on a voluntary and symmetric relation between experts in the same field, 
is what we will further on describe as cooperation.
Coordination is a different way of working together. Unlike cooper-
ation, which in its purest form does not involve any division of labor, 
this is a prerequisite for coordination. In this context, coordination 
may be described as when, for example, one leader or a small num-
ber of leaders get a large number of workers, who perform small and 
specialized functions within a department, section or organization, to 
pull in the same direction. This form of coaction has an element of 
hierarchy in it (Axelsson & Axelsson, 2006). The integration is based 
on dependency, which occurs when each contributor only works 
on a small and specialized task within a larger organizational entity 
(Durkheim, 2000). For this entity to work properly, coordination is 
required. The leader who coordinates is to be found in the upper level 
of the hierarchy, and has the final authority to decide in cases where 
there are mixed opinions. The workers, some with higher professional 
acquirements, are to be found in the lower level of the hierarchy. 
Coordination is, for example, used in bureaucracies to carry out a 
wide array of routine tasks, involving a large number of people with 
different skills.
The difference between coordinating leaders and cooperative clini-
cians can be further explored by adding Michael Power’s distinction 
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between first-order and second-order risk (Power, 2004). First-order risk 
is addressed when a peer group of psychiatrists or psychologists coop-
erate to reconstruct the individual medical history of a patient who has 
committed suicide, in order to learn more and in the long run, ideally to 
strengthen professional evaluation so that there is less likelihood of new 
patients committing suicide. The aim of the leader’s coordination and 
second-order risk evaluation is not to reduce future incidents of suicide, 
but to reduce future chances of not discovering administrative mistakes 
and omissions in the department, section or in the overall internal con-
trol system. 
Before we present and analyze our findings from the study of the 
terms cooperation and coordination, we will briefly explain the status of 
knowledge concerning suicide amongst patients, and the administrative 
provisions that leaders and clinicians in the Norwegian specialist health 
services are subject to when a patient undergoing treatment commits 
suicide. 
Administration of suicides in the specialist 
health care services
Suicide prevention amongst psychiatric patients is an important prior-
ity of the Norwegian Board of Health Supervision (NBHS). The national 
cause of death statistics from 2016 show that the number of registered 
suicides in Norway was 614; 418 of these were men and 198 were women. 
The most common method is hanging, followed by poisoning, shooting 
and drowning. Suicide attempts are more common amongst women, and 
the number of suicide attempts is assumed to be between 5000 and 6000 
each year (Folkehelseinstituttet.no). Mental illnesses increase the chance 
of committing suicide, but even so, the suicide rate amongst people with 
psychiatric diagnoses is low. Each year, there are approximately 50 reg-
istered suicides among patients admitted to psychiatric institutions. In 
addition, there is an unknown number of suicides amongst patients 
undergoing outpatient treatment and those newly discharged from a psy-
chiatric institution. We do not know how many unreported suicides there 
are among psychiatric patients. 
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According to specialist health care legislation in Norway, it is the 
leaders at hospitals who are formally responsible for detecting different 
kinds of adverse events and also initiating changes when mistakes that 
put patients at risk are made. When a patient commits suicide during 
treatment, an inspection unit investigates the case on behalf of the NBHS. 
The inspection unit is a multidisciplinary team with members from the 
health profession, the legal system and the police. According to the law, 
the inspection unit from the NBHS must be informed about the suicide 
within 24 hours. In the most complicated cases, the inspection unit con-
ducts an inspection in the department in question, to collect information 
from clinicians, leaders, and the patient’s family or dependents. The pur-
pose is to clarify the causes of actions and to prevent similar cases from 
happening in the future. The requirement of patient safety has always been 
integrated in the professional ethics of clinicians, but it was first in 1980 
that the law regarding professional advisability was passed. In our con-
text, meeting the requirements of professional advisability involves both 
leaders serving an administrative system designed to expose and correct 
mistakes which may have a potential impact on patients’ health and safety, 
and psychiatrists or psychologists who carry out satisfactory clinical eval-
uations and acceptable treatment of each individual patient. The shared 
legal responsibility between leaders and clinicians does not, however, 
prevent them from experiencing a patient’s suicide very differently.
Statistics, suicide risk and discretionary 
assessment
To reduce the chances of suicide committed by patients undergoing treat-
ment, suicide risk is measured. Complex relations between a person and 
a situation must be discretionary evaluated up against suicidal thoughts 
and plans, in addition to many other factors of risk. The risk factors for 
suicide are estimated according to studies of previous suicide cases. At 
the group level, it is possible to predict the suicide rate in the population 
from statistical examinations, but at the individual level, it is not possible 
to predict accurately who will commit suicide (Motto & Bostrom, 1990). 
Suicides are so rare that as a clinician, in the long run one will make 
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less mistakes without even trying to use one’s professional discretion on 
the individual patient and instead make a general assumption that no 
patient will commit suicide, even in a population where a lot of risk fac-
tors are present (Kapur, 2004). This does not mean that data from group 
statistics is completely irrelevant for clinical purposes, but it must be crit-
ically rather than casually interpreted (Larsen & Teigen, 2015). Different 
methods for improving our knowledge about suicide risk in Norway are 
suggested. We do not have a personal register over suicides committed 
by patients in psychiatric health care, and according to Rønneberg and 
Walby, we should look to Denmark, which has introduced this kind of 
register, to improve our clinical prognostic accuracy of suicides in Nor-
way (Rønneberg & Walby, 2008). 
There is no unified agreement between experts on the potential of 
increasing the utility of suicide statistics for clinical purposes in the 
future. The statistical basis of knowledge used today to predict suicide 
gives a low grade of specificity and sensitivity. Because of its low grade of 
specificity, the risk evaluation can cause ‘fake positives’, namely patients 
whom the clinician believes will commit suicide and actually do not. The 
same applies to its low grade of sensitivity, causing ‘fake negatives’, refer-
ring to patients the clinician believes will not commit suicide but actually 
do (Larsen, 2012). Despite the fact that many risk factors for suicide are 
well known, it is not possible to predict the individual cases. 
Method 
We have conducted individual interviews with eight clinicians and lead-
ers, who have experienced at least one suicide committed by one of their 
patients while undergoing treatment in a psychiatric department in a 
hospital. To recruit informants who made it possible to collect informa-
tive data on sensitive content, it was important to build trust between the 
researchers and respondents. The method we used was firstly, to ask for 
permission from the leaders of the psychiatric department in the hospitals 
where the study was planned to be carried out. Then we asked for permis-
sion to use the internal e-mail systems at the hospitals to inform our poten-
tial respondents about the project, and also to send an interview request 
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to the current leaders and clinicians who had experienced the suicide of 
at least one of their patients during treatment. The e-mail was used to 
reduce external pressure to take part in the study. Ten people volunteered; 
amongst these were six psychiatrists and psychologists, and the remainder 
were heads of departments and sectional leaders. For the clinicians, it was 
a prerequisite to have experienced the suicide of at least one of the patients 
whom they were mainly or partly responsible for under treatment. For the 
leaders, it was a prerequisite that they had experienced leading a section or 
department where the suicide of a patient under treatment had occurred. 
Two of the volunteering leaders did not meet these requirements, and were 
therefore not included in our group of respondents.
Each interview was conducted at the respondent’s workplace during 
working hours. To be interviewed about a serious case at the hospital can 
be experienced as a burden. It was important for us to treat the interview-
ees with respect while interviewing them, as well as in the presentation of 
data and in our analysis. To protect the anonymity of the individuals, we 
have avoided using longer quotes which might make it possible to recog-
nize them by their form of expression. The transcription of the interviews 
was made verbatim, and to systemize the transcript material we used sys-
tematic thematic text analysis (Malterud, 2012).
Results 
Below (Table 24.1) is a thematic collection of quotes, illustrating some 
main tendencies from the interviews with the clinicians and leaders who 
took part in the study. We have chosen to emphasize themes relevant to 
clinicians and leaders’ perspectives on coaction after a patient has com-
mitted suicide.
Analysis 
The patient’s suicide came unexpectedly to all the informants in our study. 
Despite the fact that both the clinicians and the leaders at a general level 
knew that patients in crisis tend to have a higher suicide risk, they did 
not see the individual suicide coming. The clinicians in our study had the 
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“It was a shock when it 
happened. It could not be 
possible. How could it happen?” 
“The despair of understanding 
that everything had gone wrong, 
questions about what we could 
have done differently, and should 
we have seen this coming?”
“The leader phones the clinicians 
and says ‘This happens, and it is a 
part of our job.’”
“Everyone on the shift gets 
information and each individual 
person reacts differently.”
“Within 24 hours, I had a meeting 
with the closest leaders and the 
clinical leaders. After the meeting, 





“There will always be many 
thoughts and self-examinations.” 
“There could be a patient that 
resembles the one that took 
his or her life. And it makes you 
react differently. The atmosphere 
is changed and you are more 
careful, and observe the other 
patients more closely.”
“In the first period we were scared. 
That is for sure.” 
“When a suicide happens, we all of 
a sudden get the need to go through 
(the internal control system) to 




“The heaviest burden is when 
the dependents come…. I have 
experienced a clinician having a 
physical reaction. It probably had 
to do with the discomfort he/she 
felt in the meeting. The superior 
sent this person home and talked 
to the dependents instead.”
“We sent all the papers to NBHS, 
and we got no comments back from 
them. Everything was documented 
and evaluated well enough, so there 
were no comments on the way we 
had handled this.”
“We were examined about how my 
employees did their job. And that is 
possibly why it was easier for me, 
because I’m not the responsible 
person. It wasn’t me who wrote the 
journal, and it wasn’t me who made 
the decision to unlock the door and 
let the patient go.”
WHO EXAMINES 
THE SUICIDE?
“Suicide examination? No, we 
don’t have any culture for doing 
that.”
“The emergency team is established, 
and we assume they examine what 
happened concerning the suicide.”
RIGHT TIMING 
OF AN INTERNAL 
EXAMINATION 
OF THE SUICIDE 
“At least two months, then you 
get a sense of distance without 
it being forgotten. You’ve had 
time to go through it over and 
over again, and at the same time 
you are less emotionally involved 
with it.” 
“I think it is smart to have a 
systematic examination closely 
following the suicide.”
“An examination after 4 weeks is 
okay, but preferably as soon as 
possible. We continuously admit 
many new patients, and for me it is 
good to get things done.”
(Continued)







“I had a need to explain my role, 
but it was never talked about. “ 
“I couldn’t bring up my issues at a 
meeting. They don’t belong there. 
To take care of the nurses is one of 
our tasks as doctors, and it would 
have been a burden to bring up 
my own issues there .”
“The workplace is mostly 
concerned with protecting itself 
legally, and a list of suicide risk 
factors must be put in the journal, 
without it necessarily being good 
for the patient, the dependents or 
the therapist.”
“My experience is that doctors are 
not good at reporting their needs, 
and it is easy to miscalculate them. 
They usually say things are fine, and 
that they have full control over the 
situation; then I discover that they 
have a need for support that they 
have not conveyed.”
“It is very important for us to show 
how well the patients have become, 
and a part of the treatment is to 
be allowed to go out on their own 
undertaking. But we can become 
even better at coping with what this 
does to the clinician who lets the 
patient go, when the patient then 
commits suicide.”
COACTION 
EXPECTED TO BE 
ADEQUATE
“I would prefer an examination 
(of the suicide) to include only 
clinicians and leaders. I think that 
an interdisciplinary examination 
(including nurses) is more 
uncomfortable, and that the risk 
of ending up shooting at each 
other increases.” 
“For me, I think it would have 
been expedient if it was only the 
clinicians who had the meeting.” 
“I doubt if the person responsible 
for treatment is comfortable with 
everyone being present, but at the 
same time, this suicide examination 
should be interdisciplinary because it 
is the way we work.”
“We have pretty good guidelines for 
evaluating suicide risk. It was maybe 
a bit random at the start, but after the 
first episodes… then we decided to 
have very good control over this… and 
that is good to have, and to know that 
the evaluation is documented.”
overall strongest emotional reaction to the suicide, but the feeling of fear 
and the need for self-examination affected both the clinicians and the 
leaders. After being informed about the suicide, the clinicians describe 
thoughts about what they could have done differently in the treatment 
of the patient. Fear of contravening the law was a central issue, both for 
the leaders and the clinicians’ self-examination. But in contrast to the 
leaders, whose first reaction was to focus on checking organizational rou-
tines, the clinicians’ attention was drawn to the personal ‘me and you’ 
relationship with the patient. 
The clinicians describe the first period after the suicide as a time for 
questioning themselves on what they might have done differently to pre-
vent this particular individual from committing suicide. Some clinicians 
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describe the discomfort before the upcoming meeting with the patient’s 
dependents, as an overwhelming experience, and doubt about one’s own 
professional competence as a clinician is linked to fear of what the future 
holds regarding meetings with new patients. During the first period after 
the suicide, the clinicians in our study seek to reduce first-order risk, 
namely, the chances of another patient committing suicide. One of the 
informants also mentions that after the suicide, he experienced a period 
of increased awareness of potential signs of danger occurring in the treat-
ment of new patients, and that he more closely observed patients who 
reminded him of the one who committed suicide. 
Compared to the leaders in our study, it seems like the clinicians to 
a lesser extent come to accept the genuinely unpredictable aspects of 
the individual suicide. Thoughts about what they could have done better 
persist longer for the clinicians. The clinicians describe a need to wait sev-
eral months before the emotional pressure decreases and they are ready 
for an examination of the suicide. When, and if, the suicide is examined 
systematically, they describe a need for a ‘closed circle’, where guilt and 
scapegoating are put aside. For the clinicians in our study, the preferred 
way of working together is to cooperate in a peer-review, to find out more 
about what actually happened with the individual person who commit-
ted suicide. When the clinicians in our study are stuck and seek help, 
they prefer a small group of peers with equal responsibility and/or equal 
qualifications. In this preferred peer-group, the members have either per-
sonally experienced, or realize that in the future they might experience, 
the suicide of a patient they were responsible for. 
‘To cooperate’ is a term we have previously used to describe a voluntary 
relation between experts on the same subject who are working together. 
However, the meaning of the term ‘cooperation’, in our particular context, 
must not be confused with the organizing principles of interdisciplinary 
teams. The different professions involved in the interdisciplinary teams in 
our study have an asymmetrical relation to each other and, in accordance 
with the principles of division of labor used in all complex organizations, 
the members of the interdisciplinary teams help out with their unique 
skills in the treatment of a patient. The asymmetrical relations between 
the members of an interdisciplinary team is what concerns some of the 
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clinicians in our study. After a patient has unexpectedly committed sui-
cide, the psychologists and psychiatrists we interviewed describe a need 
to step out of their roles as professional leaders at the top of the interdisci-
plinary team hierarchy. To replace the asymmetrical relations, they seek 
peers with equal competence or an equal formal responsibility, to develop 
more systemized knowledge about the individual patient’s suicide. ‘To 
cooperate’ is, for some clinicians, something that can only occur in the 
absence of a formal hierarchy defining the different positions of group 
members in the hospital’s interdisciplinary team. The psychologists and 
psychiatrists we met were seeking to prevent the pursuit of the ‘guilty’ 
person, or ‘shooting at each other’ as one of them puts it.
For the leaders who are responsible for coordination of all the internal 
and external bodies which must be informed consecutively after the sui-
cide, the fact that documentation of risk evaluation is performed means 
something more than a simple technical analytical praxis with the aim of 
preventing suicide. Documentation is a key element for heads of depart-
ments and sectional leaders, who must cope with both internal and exter-
nal claims for accountability after the suicide.
For the leaders, the response from the Emergency Services team from 
the State Health Authority is important. It reduces their uncertainty 
about the quality of the documentation, and gives them an answer to the 
question of whether the evaluation of the patient was good enough. The 
Health Authority’s administrative vocabulary, where expressions like 
no comments or everything was documented well enough are used also 
by the leaders, to show that an external state-controlled inspection has 
ensured them that their responsibility for the organization’s second-de-
gree suicide risk evaluation has been properly handled.
The leaders in our interviews describe their coordinating function 
after an unexpected suicide as a ‘leader-organization’ relation, where 
the organization’s internal control system is at the center of their overall 
administrative responsibility, while they also try to give attention to ‘the 
human factor,’ by protecting the individual clinicians who only to vary-
ing degrees express their personal needs after the suicide of one of their 
patients. The hospital’s mandatory way of organizing work is regarded 
by the leaders as binding, and the interdisciplinary teams are seen as 
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the right forum for an examination of the suicide. If the present way of 
organizing teamwork makes things harder for the psychiatrists and the 
psychologists, it might be possible to adjust the interdisciplinary team-
work on a smaller scale; “we can look at who’s participating”, but the lead-
ers do not give permission to deselect the interdisciplinary teamwork.
For the clinicians, it is of crucial importance to understand what actu-
ally happened to the individual patient who committed suicide. They are 
not always satisfied and done with a case even though the State Health 
Authorities have not found any formal faults in the documentation of 
their treatment of the patient. The leaders, on the other hand, are more 
impatient and eager to close the case. They focus on standardized proce-
dures which are mandatory after the suicide, and on the general organi-
zational demand to get things done. Unlike the clinicians, the leaders in 
our study do not question the assumption that the Emergency Services 
team from the State Health Authority is the right organ to evaluate the 
case and provide learning from the individual suicide. The leaders seem 
to have a quite well-defined set of standardized procedures to put into 
action when a patient commits suicide in their section or department. In 
contrast, the psychiatrists and psychologists in our study describe fewer 
adequate, organized routines to guide their coaction as clinical experts 
after a patient has committed suicide under treatment. 
The fact that the statistical foundation for knowledge about suicide-risk 
evaluation is based on a weak prediction of individual suicides, was not 
reflected upon by our informants. Another issue, of silence, was explicitly 
noticed by one of the clinicians, who described an urgent need to explain 
his or her role after the suicide, but says, “it was not mentioned”. The 
mute space which sometimes surrounds the responsible clinician after a 
patient has committed suicide, was also pointed to by some of the leaders.
Discussion
By using the two terms, ‘coordination’ and ‘cooperation’, to study coac-
tion in the meeting with the unexpected, we have discovered things and 
asked questions in accordance with organizational theory. Coordina-
tion is an organizational function that leaders are responsible for. The 
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leaders in our study experience their coordinating work as effective. The 
success criteria for their coordination work after a patient’s suicide is to 
facilitate organizational communication between a formally-defined set 
of positions at different hierarchical levels, in a quick and correct way. 
The leaders coordinating tasks are guided and supported by the hospi-
tal’s administrative routines and established ways of working. When the 
unexpected suicide occurs, the leader knows exactly what he or she must 
do, since the principles of coordination are the same in all cases of suicide.
Cooperation is a different way of working together. Compared to coor-
dination, it is to a lesser degree practiced in the hospital’s departments 
and sections. However, some of the clinicians in our study describe their 
experiences or needs for cooperation in situations when they are stuck and 
need help from colleagues who share their competence and responsibility. 
The principles of voluntary participation and equal expertise or responsi-
bility are important qualities for this type of coaction between peers. Only 
some of the clinicians have succeeded in initiating cooperative networks 
with their peers. Cooperation is when an expert who has experienced the 
loss of a patient as a result of suicide, asks one or more experts who have 
had the same experience, or who may be likely to have it, to go through the 
patient’s history thoroughly from start to finish, in order to understand 
it better and to learn more about what happened. This way of working 
together as experts has the potential to strengthen the involved parties’ 
clinical judgment, but our respondents have not seen many examples of 
this way of coaction after a suicide from their own experience. 
Whether the use of clinical judgment has any effect at all on the predic-
tion of suicide is uncertain. The experts think differently about the effect 
of clinical predictability. Rønneberg and Walby (2008) advocate that psy-
chiatry, as well as other medical specialties, can become, in the long run, a 
fairly trustworthy prognostic science. In their opinion, Norway should fol-
low Denmark’s example and establish person-identifiable patient records, 
which show that in Denmark, the population’s attributable risk of suicide 
is approximately 40% of those who have been hospitalized in a psychiatric 
daycare department. Nikolas Rose positions himself on the other side of 
the continuum, and thinks that suicide amongst patients under psychiat-
ric treatment is a genuinely unpredictable phenomenon; this fundamental 
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unpredictability cannot be eliminated by psychiatrists or psychologists 
(Rose 1996, 1998). Berg and Teigen disagree that the efforts in regard to 
clinical predictions are a waste, but the problem with these predictions is 
that they make us more pessimistic than necessary (Berg & Teigen, 2003). 
Larsen and Teigen remind us that suicide, after it has happened, will always 
seem to have been forewarned, even though it could not be predicted in 
the past (Larsen & Teigen, 2015). This difference in perspectives does not 
show up in statistics, but can cause unfair scapegoating of clinicians, and 
unrealistic hopes for scientific studies promising suicide prevention. 
Concluding remarks 
As we have seen in the analysis above, the leaders and clinicians in our 
study have different ways of coping with the unexpected. The leaders stabi-
lize the organization after a patient has committed suicide, by using admin-
istrative routines which are the same in every suicide case. As coordinators, 
our leaders experienced that their past knowledge could be used in new 
cases. Over time, they accumulate trust in the procedures connecting all 
the different participants at multiple hierarchical levels, both inside and 
outside of their own section or department. Together, all these participants 
coordinated in formalized relations to each other have a capacity to handle 
even the most complex and unpredictable events, according to the leaders. 
The clinicians in our study have fewer ready-made guidelines for 
action in the face of an unforeseen suicide. As opposed to the leaders, 
who already know what to do, the clinicians seek to learn from the case 
as it unfolds. They do not want to close the case before they understand it. 
If the suicide is reviewed systematically, which rarely happens, according 
to our respondents, the clinician wants it to take place in a closed colle-
gial circle where issues of responsibility and guilt are set aside to work 
together, to cooperate. 
In the Bow-tie Model (Chapter 1, Torgersen, 2018), ‘loss of control’ is a 
phenomenon that is closely linked to the moment the unforeseen occurs. 
To the leaders in our study, this way of picturing the unpredictable 
matches the experience and the way of coping with it. The leaders prac-
tice ways of working together which effectively stabilize the organization 
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after a suicide, while the situation for the clinicians is different. ‘Loss of 
control’ for them is not a phenomenon lasting for a short period after the 
moment of the incident. On the contrary, for the clinicians in our study 
it looks like the ‘loss of control’ is a long-lasting condition. Our study 
indicates that professional recovery after a patient’s unexpected suicide 
is not a ‘straight-forward process’ after the examination of the individual 
suicide has been taken out of the clinicians’ hands and transferred to an 
external investigation body, The Inspection Unit of the NBHS. 
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